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Discussion Paper
The neural antecedents to voluntary action: A
conceptual analysis
Parashkev Nachev1 and Peter Hacker2
1Institute of Neurology, University College London, London, UK
2Department of Philosophy, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK
The inferential standards for testing hypotheses are settled; those for constructing them rarely even discussed. If
the ﬁt to the data of a hypothesis matters, then so must its fundamental coherence. That is indeed prior to any
other question. Here we make use of conceptual analysis in testing the coherence of hypotheses in cognitive
neuroscience and apply it to the study of the antecedents to voluntary action. We show that many inﬂuential
experiments in the literature are premised—often covertly—on erroneous conceptions that render their hypotheses
incoherent. The inferences drawn from the data are therefore invalidated proximally to any objection empirical
replication could counter. We further demonstrate the empirical consequences of these errors in generating
artifactual observable effects that have no general signiﬁcance and impede further progress. We conclude with
a basic framework for constructing robust hypotheses in this difﬁcult and important ﬁeld.
Keywords: Voluntary action; Conceptual analysis; Antecedents to action; Readiness potential.
The relation between voluntary action and the brain is
an empirical matter, to be determined by scientiﬁc
experiment. It is properly the business of cognitive
neuroscience, which combines the study of thought
and behavior with the study of brain anatomy and
physiology. If philosophy is to intervene here, we
must ﬁrst explain why it should.
In common with most sciences, cognitive
neuroscience does not have a ﬁxed set of tools. To the
basic equipment of psychology and physiology have
recently been added sophisticated devices borrowed
from computer science, information theory, signal
analysis, statistical physics, and many other
disciplines. This is as it should be—the methodology
of a science must evolve with its subject, in response to
its demands. Equally, the demands of a subject must not
be tailored to the available tools—a special danger in
cognitive neuroscience, where we can study the brain at
the macroscopic (e.g., fMRI) and to a lesser extent
microscopic (e.g., single cell recording) levels but
have no means of seeing the intermediate,
“mesoscopic” level at which a great deal of the critical
organization may be concealed (e.g., in medial frontal
cortex; Nachev, Kennard, & Husain, 2008).
Now when we speak of scientiﬁc tools we usually
have technical tools in mind—devices that improve
the quality of the data experiments generate. But
science is not just about data. Although exploratory
analysis of data is sometimes suggestive, the ﬁrst
move in good science is the speciﬁcation of a set of
hypotheses the data are subsequently used to help
distinguish between. Without hypotheses, data get us
nowhere just as without a vehicle fuel gets us
nowhere. A scientist has to think about the tools
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used to construct hypotheses as well as the tools used
to test them. And whereas the latter are usually
technical, the former can only be conceptual.
Crucially, for a scientiﬁc investigation to have power
both must be adequate to the task. Moreover, since
hypothesis generation precedes hypothesis testing, the
conceptual tools are often more important than the
technical ones. For a hypothesis has to make sense
before the question of testing it experimentally can
coherently arise. If a hypothesis involved an
unrecognized division by zero in its mathematics,
any data collected in an attempt to conﬁrm or inﬁrm
it would be beside the point because it would not
make any sense.
CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS IN
NEUROSCIENCE
Scientists do not require instruction on recognizing
divisions by zero. In most domains of science no
special conceptual problems arise because the use of
the concepts deployed is straightforward. It is not so
in cognitive neuroscience, for reasons that are not
easy to convey. Cognitive neuroscience unavoidably
traverses the boundaries between the neural cum
physiological and the psychological, as well as the
boundaries between the neural/physiological and the
behavioral. The concepts in these three domains are
categorically dissimilar. Their logical articulations are
unalike, and the logical connections (of implication,
exclusion, compatibility) between the different
domains are exceedingly difﬁcult to get into clear
view. The relationships are not at all like those
between, say, ionic and molecular descriptions of
chemical phenomena. The different domains are not
reducible one to another, and what explanations are
appropriate to one domain may be inappropriate to
another. How the description of phenomena in one
domain bears on the description of phenomena in
another is highly problematic.
The task is all the harder for seeming, at ﬁrst
glance, so easy. Any mature speaker of our language
is master of the rich psychological vocabulary of our
language, is able to use the verbs, nouns, adverbs, and
adjectives that characterize human beings (and, up to
a limited point, other animals). But to be master of the
use of words does not imply possession of an ability
to give an overview of the use. One may use such
terms as “voluntarily,” “on purpose,” “deliberately,”
“intentionally” perfectly correctly and without any
hesitation, but when questioned about their
relationships, one may have the greatest difﬁculty
responding. Can one act intentionally without acting
voluntarily?—Yes, when one does something under
duress. Can one act voluntarily without acting
intentionally?—Yes, when one does something
knowingly but neither because one wants to do it
nor for any further reason, as when one gestures
while one speaks; or when one knowingly does
something that is an unwanted or not wanted
consequence or by-product of one’s intentional
action, as when one wakes one’s wife when putting
the cat out at night. Is everything one does
intentionally also done deliberately? No, for much
of our intentional behavior requires no deliberation
or decision, but is done as a matter of course, as when
one opens the door when going out or gets on the bus
when the bus one awaits arrives. Can one do
something with the further intention of doing
something else (e.g., go to London to visit Jack),
without doing what one does with the purpose of
doing that other thing? Yes, for example, when one
goes to the theater with the intention of catching the
last bus home. For one’s purpose in going to the
theater is not to catch the last bus home.
Most of us would have great difﬁculty in coming
up with these answers off the cuff. That shows that
one can master the use of an expression without
having an overview of that use. It also demonstrates
the fact that mastery of use does not imply mastery of
comparative use. One may be able to ﬁnd one’s way
round an old town with unerring exactness, but be
quite unable to draw a map. But to construct fruitful
and coherent hypotheses in cognitive neuroscience, a
conceptual map is needed lest the questions be
incoherent, the presuppositions misguided, and the
hypotheses tacitly unintelligible.
Some will ﬁnd these arguments unpersuasive-
perhaps inevitably so, since blindness to our defects
here—what neurologists call anosognosia—is a
constituent of the problem. But all scientists agree
that we need a standard for determining whether or
not a set of data supports a hypothesis, indeed we
have a well-developed conceptual apparatus for it—
statistical inference—and a commonly agreed
criterion: <0.05 probability of error. If this is so,
then it is perverse not to demand a standard for
determining whether or not a hypothesis makes
sense in the ﬁrst place. The application of such a
standard requires apparatus for determining not
empirical truth but conceptual sense—coherence.
Our tool here is conceptual analysis—a process of
examining the constituent concepts of a hypothesis
and their putative relations, unraveling the nexus of
connections so that any incoherences between them
can be laid bare. It is kin with the familiar process of
looking for confounds—alternative explanatory factors
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that voidahypothesis, so framed,of thepower tobe tested
experimentally, thereby rendering the data irrelevant to
the question they are collected to answer. What we are
proposing is therefore something good scientists do
already—we merely set it within a comprehensive
framework that helps the novice learn how to do it well.
Though conceptual in method, such an analysis has
consequences for empirical research. It is no less
pertinent to the formation and validation of empirical
hypotheses than the mathematical theorems invoked in
formulating those hypotheses.
THE CONCEPTUAL LANDSCAPE OF
VOLUNTARY ACTION
To make an assertion about the neural processes that
make voluntary action possible one must be clear
about what voluntary action is. Without such clarity
one’s experiment may be conﬁned to a conception of
action that has no application outside the
experimental setting and is therefore of no broad
consequence, or worse, one may be shipwrecked on
the rocks of a misconception of what counts as an
action (for example, confusing a reﬂex reaction with
an action, or conﬂating bare doing with acting).
Unless what we discover ramiﬁes into the legal,
moral, wider social reality, it will be of no interest
to anyone. The ﬁrst step here, therefore, has to be a
survey of voluntary action, spanning the full
landscape so that the boundaries of each aspect can
be brought into view (see Hacker, 2007, for a full
discussion).
We must draw some preliminary distinctions
between doing something and acting or taking
action, between act and activity, between acting and
refraining from acting. All agents, inanimate as well
as animate, do things. All acting is doing, but not all
doing is acting. Inanimate and non-sentient agents do
things, but do not act. A rolling stone is doing
something, namely rolling downhill, but it is not
acting, and a plant may be growing, but not acting.
On the other hand, such agents with causal powers
may do things to other agents, i.e., act on them and so
bring about or prevent change in the patient upon
which they act. Nevertheless, insentient beings
cannot take action. They may have an action, as
many machines and organs of an animal do, but
they cannot act or perform deeds—for only beings
that can take action can also act. To take action is to
act voluntarily in response to a circumstance (e.g., a
threat) or in pursuit of a goal, given apprehension of
an opportunity. So a creature that can take action is
one that can do or refrain from doing something
voluntarily, that can have or seize an opportunity,
that can opt for or choose one course of action over
another.
Sentient creatures may do things that fall short of
acting (e.g., fall asleep). Among things they do are
reactions that cannot be initiated at will. Some of
these may be controllable and inhibitable (e.g.,
stiﬂing a sneeze, cough, or yawn). While inanimate
doings are mere motion or change, when self-moving
intelligent beings do such things they act (walk or
run, climb or jump) or take action. This may, but need
not, involve acting on another thing. Acting on
another thing is to bring about or prevent change in
or to the other thing by one’s action. An animate
being may move as an inanimate being moves (e.g.,
slip, fall), and its limbs may move without the animal
moving them (e.g., reﬂex actions, being subjected to
the force of another thing). But characteristic animal
movements are forms of behavior of which it makes
sense to say that it is voluntary, done on purpose in
pursuit of a goal. Voluntary behavior is behavior that
is controlled by the agent, that exempliﬁes a two-way
power to do or refrain from doing. Voluntary behavior
stands in contrast to both involuntary behavior (when
what is done on some occasion is not under one’s
control) and non-voluntary behavior (e.g., when what
one does is done under duress).
Human beings, like other sentient animals with
wants, have the power to move or refrain from
moving, to act or refrain from acting, at will. “To
move” here does not mean causing a movement, but
making one. When a human being’s movement is an
act, it is of a kind that falls within the ambit of the
variety of teleological explanations appropriate to
human action. A woman may have moved her hand
in order to …, or because she wanted to …, or
because she thought that …, for such-and-such a
reason, or out of such-and-such a motive, and so on.
The movement is to be understood as liable to the
range of explanations of the exercise of two-way
powers by a rational being—a being sensitive to
reasons for acting and responding. Such behavior is
typically under the control of the agent. She is
answerable for it. It is something she can do or
refrain from doing at will, and for which she may
have a reason for doing that explains and justiﬁes or
purports to justify what she does.
We distinguish act from activity, the active from
the passive, and act from omission. An activity is a
sequence of acts. It may be a repetition of acts (e.g.,
walking, running, hammering) or an ordered
sequence of acts (e.g., starting up the car and
driving off) or a sequence of acts given their unity
by their purpose within a framework of rules
ANTECEDENTS TO VOLUNTARY ACTION 3
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(playing tennis or chess) or without any such
framework. There is not one divide between action
and passion, but a number of different ones. We
contrast what we do (when we are active) with
what happens to us (when we are acted on).
Among things that happen to us, we distinguish
between what happens and what is done to us.
Among things done to us, we distinguish between
things we demand or allow to be done to us (so we
are not merely passive), and things done to us
against our will. We further contrast thought and
action, the thinker with the doer, and action with
inaction—as when we look on and do nothing, take
no action, refrain from acting.
Inaction too may take various forms. It may result
from lack of ability or lack of opportunity.
Opportunity is relative to ability—what is an
opportunity for the skillful may be none for the
incompetent. A necessary condition for not acting to
constitute omission is that there be both ability and
opportunity to act. Depending on agential knowledge,
the context, and the requirements of the
circumstances, one’s not doing something may be
omitting, abstaining, or refraining.
Characterizing action, then, in a manner that
allows the neural processes that make it possible to
be illuminated is far from straightforward. Though we
have access to the immediate, circumstantial features
of the environment, the principal difﬁculty is in
knowing how to make sense of features of the agent
that are not so easily described for they are not simply
states but abilities. Here it is tempting to lean on
conceptual devices that acquire their sense in a
different domain and offer no solid support in this
one. The only safe means of proceeding is to pause at
each step, testing the ground by considering all the
ramiﬁcations of each move, before moving forward.
And if a particular direction leads to a dead end, the
only option may be to retrace our steps to the very
beginning. Here we examine the antecedents to
action—the aspects of action preceding it that have
a bearing on its neural relations.
THE ANTECEDENTS OF ACTION
When one raises one’s arm the contraction of the
muscles is naturally preceded by activity in the motor
neurons innervating the muscle. Since all neural
signaling takes a non-zero length of time, such activity
must occur in advance of the movement. It is therefore
tempting to pursue the chain of events further up the
neural tree in the belief that at its apex must be the one
neural event, or at least a limited set of neural events,
that is the ultimate cause of the movement, or at least
explanatorily more potent than any event
contemporaneous with the movement itself. It seems
any explanation of voluntary action must explain its
antecedents ﬁrst and foremost.
The neural antecedents of action are important for
a second reason. It is constitutive of the concept of
voluntariness that what is done voluntarily lies within
the range of actions that the agent can do or refrain
from doing at will, and actualizes a possibility for
action the agent is aware of as being available.
Where a movement is invariably associated with a
somatic event it might instead be determined by the
cause of the event. For example, the knee jerk that
follows a tap on the patellar tendon may either be a
voluntary movement, coincident with the tap, or an
involuntary movement caused by activation of the
stretch reﬂex. We can distinguish between these
possibilities to the extent to which we can dissociate
the somatic event from what the subject voluntarily
does. The movement must be involuntary if the
subject is unable to refrain from doing it when the
event occurs, and we have no grounds for doubting its
voluntariness if they can do it without the event. If we
cannot demonstrate a dissociation—the event always
matches—then the question remains, strictly
speaking, unanswered, but it makes better sense to
treat the action as voluntary as long as the subject
retains the two-way control constitutive of voluntary
action. Now a difﬁculty arises where such an
indissociable somatic event is signiﬁcantly
antecedent to the action. Though our two-way
control remains, there now seems to be doubt about
the identity of the controller, for unless we invoke
backward causation, something else seems to be
determining the choice for us, in advance, making
the action covertly automatic (e.g., Walter, 2001;
Wegner, 2002). The presence of such antecedent
“brain somatic” markers may therefore not only
explain actions but also make us uneasy about their
fundamental nature.
We need to examine each of these aspects in turn.
Antecedence and causation
The notion of causation circumscribes a diversity of
concepts mapped out in detail elsewhere (Hacker,
2007). For our purposes we need only examine one
prototype of causation customarily deployed in
explanations of biological phenomena. A biologist
expects a causal explanation to specify a set of
biological components and to describe how one
component acts on another to bring about a change
4 NACHEVAND HACKER
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in it. For example, a muscle ﬁber contracts when
activated by the motor neuron that innervates it.
Sometimes, as in this example, the relation between
the components is obvious, but often it is opaque. In
such circumstances, we must look for criteria that
help us distinguish as best we can between rival
hypothetical possibilities. Amongst the criteria
commonly used in biology, two are pre-eminent—
temporal coincidence or priority, and dependence. If
the action of component A on component B occurs
after the change in B, then that action cannot be its
cause. If the presence or absence of the action of
component A (naturally or experimentally induced)
makes no difference to the occurrence of a change
in component B, then that action is unlikely to be its
cause, and certainly less likely than that of a
component to which a change in B is shown to be
more strongly dependent.1
Now in creating a biological picture of causation
here, we cannot use these two criteria in the same
way. Temporal priority is merely a binary factor—the
action of a component at any time preceding the
change in B may be its cause, giving us no grounds
for favoring or neglecting a component that acts
earlier or later. By contrast, dependence can be
indexed by continuous fractional measures (e.g.,
sensitivity and speciﬁcity), giving us a direct
comparative index of the component’s causal power,
as far as our observations allow us to grasp it. If the
change in B is shown to be more strongly dependent
on the action of component A1 than on the action of
component A2, the causal power of A1 is greater
whatever the temporal relation between A1 and A2
(as long as both precede or coincide with the change
in B). Where the dependence is the same, the
temporal factor cannot be used to rank two
components, for either earlier or later action could
be interpreted as being more important.
Where, then, does equating degree of antecedence
with causal power come from? It is a feature of many
biological mechanisms, especially at the molecular and
cellular level, to follow a serial pattern of organization-
one component acts on another at some given
probability of success (e.g., an enzyme interacting with
its substrate or a receptor with its ligand), a series of
such interactions forming a chain of causation where
each step is dependent on the preceding (Figure 1).
Within such a serial chain, the probability of each link
is conditional on the preceding, and since each link
takes up a ﬁnite length of time, temporal priority and
dependence of the ﬁnal outcome become
circumstantially correlated. The best criterion is still
dependence, it is just that in such circumstances
temporal priority is a good enough proxy.
Now the brain is certainly not a simple serial
system, at least not at the neural level. In the
context of voluntary action, it is well established
that multiple parallel pathways are simultaneously
co-activated antecedent to action (e.g., Cisek &
Kalaska, 2005). Temporal priority here cannot be
assumed to coincide with causal power: We must
always closely examine the nature of the association
between the activity of a candidate component—
whatever its timing—and the voluntary action. We
must do this not only for neural antecedents but also
for any behavioral or cognitive antecedents others
have attempted to bring into causal play, either as
causal elements in themselves, or as reliable
temporal markers of accompanying neural processes
that are supposedly causal.
With this in mind, let us consider a few antecedent
phenomena implicated in causal accounts of
voluntary action. We focus on only a few because
the critical points are obviously extendable to others-
to be exhaustive here is merely to be exhausting. We
begin with cognitive antecedents.
URGES
It is held that urges are antecedents to action that may
illuminate the neural processes underlying action in
general (Haggard & Libet, 2001; Haggard, 2008). At
ﬁrst sight, urges appear to satisfy the requirements for
antecedents that may be licitly implicated in causal
accounts of voluntary action. First, urges are
deﬁnitionally antecedent to action. One can have an
urge to V without V-ing, as when we “suppress” the
urge, but if we do not stiﬂe the urge, then it antecedes
the V-ing. If an urge to V follows V-ing, then it can
only be an urge to V again. Where an urge
accompanies V-ing—which is only possible where
V-ing takes an appreciable length of time—it does
so only to the extent to which the V-ing is
incomplete, for example, when one’s bladder is not
fully empty, or an itch remains. This case thus
effectively reduces to the circumstances where the
urge precedes the action. Secondly, an urge is an
occurrent phenomenon with genuine duration—we
can report when it began, how long it lasted, and
when it ended. Thirdly, an urge is always transitive-
it is an urge to V, where V is a speciﬁc action, or at
1The picture is more complex than this, but our simplifying here
for the sake of brevity does not change the conclusions. For further
details, especially the notion of causal conditions, see Mackie,
1974.
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least—for example, in the case of ﬁdgeting—a
circumscribed set of possible actions.
On closer examination serious difﬁculties arise.
First, one normally acts without feeling any urge to
act. Indeed, urges are both relatively rare and speciﬁc
to circumstances that obviously differ from common
instances of voluntary action (Jackson, Parkinson,
Kim, Schüermann, & Eickhoff, 2011). Moreover,
absence of a felt urge to act is clearly not a criterion
for the involuntariness or non-voluntariness of what
was done. Urges are most commonly felt needs to do
something (e.g., sneeze or yawn) that we cannot
initiate at will, but can sometimes suppress, either to
the point of disappearance or for a while, or felt needs
to do something that is under partial control but that
we can sometimes initiate at will—such as scratching
an itch or voiding bladder or bowels. Where we rarely
refer to urges as felt needs that are less somatic and
more “intentional” in character—e.g., to kiss someone
one loves, to hug a child, to hit someone who is being
intolerably offensive—we use the term analogically
from the less voluntary use as a way of illustrating the
strength of our desire. Language is full of such
analogical uses—one does not need a real weapon
to kill a conversation, a physical key to unlock a
problem, a source of water to rain on someone’s
parade, etc.—that mislead if taken literally. We
know the use here is analogical because we can
describe such circumstances perfectly well without
recourse to the notion of an urge.
Second, urges are characteristic of circumstances
where actions are normally withheld, at least for a
time. Indeed, it is striking that urges are commonly
spoken of in relation to “automatic” actions we do not
positively choose to execute but only to delay, such as a
sneeze or a yawn. Where actions are sometimes
automatic and at other times voluntary—coughing,
blinking, urinating—urges tend to arise in the former
case and not the latter. If an action is executed at the
same time as the occurrence of a felt need (as in the case
of an infant voiding its bladder or sneezing) we would
not speak of an urge—because the action is already
being carried out. Inhibition of the movement—either
voluntarily or non-voluntarily through physical restraint
—therefore must be constitutive of an urge, for an urge
implies both a felt need for an action and the prevention
of its satisfaction. Far from being causal antecedents to
action generally, if urges have any physiological
connection with the neural substrate that makes actions
possible, it is with circumstances of suppressing or
Figure 1. Temporal priority and causality.
Notes:Many biological mechanisms, especially at the molecular and cellular level, follow a serial pattern—one component acts
on another with some given probability of success (e.g., an enzyme interacting with its substrate or a receptor with its ligand), a series
of such interactions forming a chain of causation where each step is comparably dependent on the preceding (left diagram). Within
such systems causality and temporal priority coincide—it therefore makes sense to speak of the ﬁrst event as being causally the most
important. This is true only of serial systems. Where a system is parallel, such as the brain, time no longer coincides with causal
power (right diagram). Here, what matters is the relative dependence of the individual components (arrow line fractions in diagram),
not their temporal order, and temporal order cannot be used as a proxy measure of causal power.
In the context of causal accounts of voluntary action, if an agent can change his action with perfect control 200 ms before it is
done, then that a weak bias may be demonstrated 1000 ms earlier does not signiﬁcantly change its voluntariness.
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being prevented from doing something, rather than with
ordinary voluntary behavior (Nachev, 2011; Rothwell &
Edwards, 2011).
Empirically, the most commonly cited observation,
due ﬁrst to Itzhak Fried and his colleagues (Fried et al.,
1991), is the report of an urge to move without any overt
movement when focal areas of the brain are electrically
stimulatedmacroscopically, i.e., with large electrodes that
will typically inﬂuence the activity of millions of neurons
simultaneously. The areas fromwhich such responses can
be evoked are generally close to “motor” areas where
stimulation more commonly (or at higher intensity)
produces overt movements (Fried et al., 1991; Lim
et al., 1994). But these are highly artiﬁcial—and
deﬁnitionally abnormal—circumstances, characterized
by many confounding factors that offer as good or
better an explanation for the results as a general link
between urges and actions. It is in the fundamental
nature of macroscopic electrical stimulation of the brain
that it cannot be strictly localized to the area being
stimulated, for the current will have remote effects both
physically, by potential spread at the site of stimulation,
and neurally, via axonal connections. It is also in the
nature of such stimulation that its effects on the tissues
may be stimulant, depressant, or any combination
thereof, and may relate to the intensity of stimulation in
complex (e.g., non-monotonic) ways. Making sense of
such results is therefore difﬁcult.
In any event, it cannot be assumed, as some have
implied (Haggard & Libet, 2001), that just as
electrical stimulation of neural tissue may be
physiologically subthreshold, insufﬁcient to evoke a
neural response, so stimulation that only evokes an
urge is psychologically subthreshold, insufﬁcient for
an overt movement. Indeed, several aspects of the
phenomenon go against the received interpretation.
First, urges were rare in Fried’s study, being
observed at only 15 of the 129 eloquent sites. If an
urge is subthreshold to an overt response, then it
ought to be more easily elicited than an overt
response—in clinical studies the standard practice is
to start with low intensity stimulation at each site and
increase until either a predeﬁned limit is reached or a
response observed. It also ought to be commoner than
an overt response, for the volume of brain tissue
above a threshold approached incrementally from
below is likely to be smaller than the volume above
a substantially lower threshold—this is a consequence
of the commonly observed current density spread
function (Tehovnik, 1996). Second, where an overt
movement was observed following higher intensity
stimulation, it was not always congruent with the
urge, sometimes even involving a different limb. If
the urges elicited here are closely related to the action
executed, then they must be speciﬁc to it. Third, overt
sensory responses of various kinds were more than
twice as common as urges, inevitably downgrading
our conﬁdence in the speciﬁcity of the patient’s report
here. Given the natural ecology of urges we have
described and its dominance by circumstances of
movement suppression, urges in this context are
arguably better explained by co-activation of the
neural substrates of incompatible movements than
they are by subthreshold stimulation of what would,
at stronger current, evoke an overt movement. We do
not need to supply a robust alternative account of the
effects of stimulation here—the critical point we wish
to make is that the data clearly admit of too many
equally or more plausible alternative explanations to
draw strong empirical support for any general role of
urges in voluntary action.
Many of these concerns extend to a recent
stimulation study of the parietal cortex in which a
reported desire to move (in the absence of any overt
movement) is described (Desmurget et al., 2009).
Moreover, the picture here is emphatically against a
causal link between intention and action, for higher
intensity stimulation at sites evocative of such reports
at low intensity produced not overt movement, but the
mistaken report that a movement had already
occurred. The latter ﬁnding is readily intelligible as
the proprioceptive or kinesthetic analog of a somatic
sensory illusion easily elicited from neighboring
parietal sensory regions, but what about the former?
All we can say is that it is very difﬁcult to know
exactly what the patients were describing, for their
vocabulary is here being unnaturally applied to
circumstances entirely outside the experience from
which it has acquired its sense. Reasoning
parsimoniously, if one felt a weak proprioceptive
sensation of movement, one might well report it as a
desire to complete the movement. Whatever the
correct interpretation, a causal link between intention
and movement is not amongst the possible inferences
here.
Moreover, across the spectrum of pathological
conditions, there is a clear dissociation between
abnormalities of urges and action that makes a
causal link between them implausible (Jackson
et al., 2011). There are disorders of movement, such
as chorea, where an obvious excess of voluntary
movement is not associated with any reported urges
to move—the patients simply move. Conversely,
there are disorders associated with an excess of
urges to move, such as Gilles de la Tourette
syndrome (Shapiro, Shapiro, Gerald, & Feinberg,
1988), where the movements themselves may be
much less frequent than the urges. Critically, in
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pathological conditions where urges are a major part
of the clinical picture, the movements are always
perceived to be unwanted by the patient: Inhibition
of movement is invariably present. To the extent to
which urges are a distinctive marker of anything here
they are of the desire to inhibit movement.
INTENTIONS
At ﬁrst sight, intentions appear to remedy the defects
of urges as causal antecedents while retaining their
virtues. If a subject avows an intention—though she
need not for the action to be intentional—then the
intention avowed will antecede or coincide with the
action. Intentions are identiﬁed by the intended
action, and so are speciﬁc to the action. But unlike
urges, intentions are not ecologically limited to
circumstances of response suppression—there is
none of the element of compulsion and its resistance
here—and so generalization across the spectrum of
voluntary action seems possible.
Unfortunately, a closer look reveals immediate
difﬁculties. To intend to do something is not merely
to be able to say what you are going to do in advance
of doing it, even if declarations of intentions are
usually good grounds for predictions. “I am going to
vomit,” “I am going to shiver,” “I am going to have a
seizure,” may be perfectly accurate predictions of
future movements (amongst other things) but they
cannot be declarations of intentions. It is not the
accuracy of the prediction that distinguishes
intentions but the retained ability to do otherwise,
coupled with either wanting to do the intended act
or with reasons for doing it. Indeed, unlike a
prediction, an expression of intention is not falsiﬁed
by failure to carry out the intended action. That
someone intends to V is the ground for a prediction
that she will V conditional on other things in the
world being as she expects them to be. Saying that I
intend to drink wine from a glass does not commit me
to the action if in the interim I see someone put
poison in it, if I notice that the edge is cracked, if I
spot a better vintage nearby, and so on. To attempt to
connect intentions with actions within a causal
biological model therefore necessitates bringing in
all the conditionals on which fulﬁlling the intention
implicitly depends. In any given circumstance, one
may be able to cite a set of conditionals, but it is hard
to see how one could ever specify them
comprehensively, for the horizon of possible
conditionals here is uncircumscribable in principle.
One could try to limit the possibilities within an
experimental task, but all that does is to make the
task inadequate to the problem it is supposed to
illuminate, for the lack of constraint is precisely why
we speak of voluntary action as free. Furthermore, the
subject of an experiment is always free to stop
playing.
In any event, most voluntary actions and most
intentional actions are not preceded by any kind of
antecedent intention—one merely acts—and one’s act
may be voluntary without being intentional, or it may
be both voluntary and intentional or, indeed, non-
voluntary and intentional, as when one acts under
duress. To act intentionally does not require the
formation of an antecedent intention, any more than
it requires antecedent deliberation and decision.
Even if we insist on pursuing intentions, we cannot
easily pin them down, so as to correlate them with
any kind of neural process. Intentions are not felt.
They are not kinds of sensation (neither local, like
pains, nor global, like weariness). They have no
somatic location, they do not have degrees of
intensity, and they have no phenomenological
properties (they neither throb nor sting, and are
neither sharp nor dull). There is no such thing as
feeling an intention. (As Schopenhauer observed, the
Will is not an Idea—intentions are formed not felt.
Hence they have no “onset.” They do not set in, like
rain, nor do they come over one, like nausea.) Unlike
occurrent feelings, emotions, and sensations,
intentions have no “genuine duration”—that is, they
cannot be interrupted and later resumed, and they
persist through periods of sleep. Intention-formation
in advance of action may be preceded by deliberation
and decision. One’s decision to V (whether or not it
was based on deliberation) occurs at a time, but not at
a split second of time (just as lunch may be at one
o’clock, but not at one o’clock, 10 seconds and 25
milliseconds). But intending need not be preceded or
accompanied by deliberation and decision—the
manifold intentional acts we perform in the course
of the day are not uniformly preceded by deliberation
and decision (the speech-acts of a normal
conversation are not). One may intend to V and one
may V intentionally without making any choice (the
possibility of a choice is not a choice)—as when one
picks up a knife in order to butter a piece of toast, or
opens a door with the intention of going to work. One
may form an intention in advance of acting, but
nevertheless not act on the intention for any number
of reasons (one may change one’s mind, forget, there
may not be an opportunity, someone else may give
one what one intended to obtain, etc.).
These objections are commonly countered by
evidence of consistency in the reported timing, for
example, when subjects are asked to match the alleged
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 C
oll
eg
e L
on
do
n]
 at
 03
:42
 28
 Ju
ly 
20
14
 
time of the “occurrence” or “onset” of their freely chosen
intention to press a button to the hands of a moving clock
in front of them (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983).
But a meaningless question can have a consistent answer.
Moreover, identiﬁcation of the putative time of the
“occurrence of intending” in such experiments is
consistent only where circumstantial features of the task
are kept the same (Banks & Isham, 2010). Where these
features are changed the result changes. For example, one
can illusorily delay the perceived time of the button press
in this task by pairing the action with a sound played
shortly thereafter. Since the time of the actual movement
remains unchanged, if intending is causing the
movement, the time of the “occurrence of intending”
should remain unchanged too—in fact, it is also
delayed, in synchrony with the illusorily delayed time
of the button press. Interference with the connection
between the reported intention and the movement
cannot be the cause of this effect because the sound
occurs after the button press (Banks & Isham, 2009).
The only possible conclusion is that the reported time
of the “occurrence of intending” does not accurately
reﬂect any contemporaneous process. Furthermore, if
one uses a digital rather than an analog clock the time
of the “occurrence of intending” is substantially delayed,
occurring much closer to the time of the movement
(Banks & Isham, 2010). The difference between digital
and analog clocks is likely explained by the well-known
“ﬂash lag” effect—the illusion that a gradual change in an
object occurs earlier than a sudden one (Hazelhoff &
Wiersma, 1924). Whatever the explanation, these
simple variations show that the consistency argument,
for whatever it is worth, cannot stand.
In short, intention cannot play a major role in
causal explanations of action because its relation to
an action cannot be causal without the action’s
ceasing to be intentional. Intention does not bring
about an actuality any more than a plan does. Its
temporal parameters are ill-deﬁned, not because we
lack the right behavioral paradigm or empirical tools
to nail them down, but because they are
constitutively so.
Let us now consider a few candidate neural
antecedents.
LATE ANTECEDENT ACTIVITY
It has been known for half a century that voluntary
movements may be preceded by several hundred
milliseconds of a characteristic modulation in neural
activity (Kornhuber & Deecke, 1965). Originally
observed in the electroencephalographic signal in the
anterior midline, the Bereitschaftspotential, as it is
commonly called, is robust enough to be used
routinely to distinguish voluntary from automatic
movements in neurological practice where the
patient’s authority on the question is for whatever
reason in doubt. A summary of the aggregate
activity of millions of neurons is naturally
polymorphous, and so there are circumstantially
differing variants of the signal that likely reﬂect
different views of the same underlying activity (e.g.,
Haggard & Eimer, 1999). It is not necessary for our
purposes to examine each variant, for the key features
on which the critical conceptual analysis depends are
shared—monotonicity, usually in the form of a slow
change most pronounced at or just before the point of
moving, and only relative speciﬁcity for the nature of
the movement that follows.
Let us ﬁrst consider the question of speciﬁcity.
Imagine that in the context of a behavioral task a
Bereitschaftspotential reliably predicts a button press
400 ms before it is made. Such circumstances are
widely held to imply a direct relation between the
neural activity and the movement. But if the same
signal were to be followed by a button release, a
ﬁnger movement at 90 degrees to the button, or any
other hand action materially different from the one
speciﬁed by the task, we could hardly speak of any
kind of speciﬁcity here. Indeed, no-one has been able
to demonstrate speciﬁcity for the actual movement
made so far in advance, only for a very wide class of
movements crudely deﬁned by features such as the
laterality of limb effector (Eimer, 1998). The
speciﬁcity here is therefore far too poor for us to
have any conﬁdence in the nature of any underlying
relation.
To this it is commonly objected that we know what
the subject is doing (because she is following our
instructions)—the crucial point is that we can predict
the timing of the action, the when already knowing the
what. But that conclusion rests on a fundamental
mistake about the criteria for individuating an action,
for the following reasons.
We naturally distinguish between what might be
called act-categories and act-individuals (von Wright,
1963)—ﬁring a riﬂe is an act-category, ﬁring a riﬂe to
kill a speciﬁc man on a speciﬁc occasion is an act-
individual. That two actions fall in the same act-
category does not mean they are the same act-
individuals. Pulling the trigger when your comrade
is in your sights is not the same action as when it is
your enemy, though the bare movement may be the
same. Indeed, two or more act-individuals might be
distinguished only by their timing. When one plays
music on the piano, the act of hitting the same note, in
the same way, at one point in the piece is different
ANTECEDENTS TO VOLUNTARY ACTION 9
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from another, and is different on different occasions
of playing the piece at the very least because one has
played the piece before. Were it not so, one could
never be able to generate a reproducibly timed
sequence of identical movements because timing
would not differentiate one movement from another.
Now consider a subject performing an experimental
task where a movement of some kind is required. The
action will fall within an act-category (e.g., button
press), but will also necessarily be an act-individual
(e.g., a left button press at time t) chosen within a
spectrum of possible acts (e.g., left vs. right button
press at time t1–tn). The act-individuation will consist
both in what is done and when it is done, not just the
former. The speciﬁcity of any neural correlate of the
action therefore must be shown in respect of both
movement and temporal features. We may be able to
show this for the former—for instance, by ﬁnding left
versus right primary motor activation reﬂecting a left or
right ﬁnger movement)—but how can we do it for the
latter? The timing of a movement cannot be speciﬁed
dichotomously, and even where the continuity of
possible times is constrained by a timing signal of
some kind there is still a natural variability of response
that is of the same order of magnitude as the temporal
antecedence of the Bereitschaftspotential. The neural
activity differentiating between possible acts differing
only in timemay itself differ only in its timing, precisely
what we are seeking to establish in the experiment. We
are therefore caught in a vicious circle with no escape—
to estimate speciﬁcity we need to know the timing of the
correlated activity and to estimate the timing we need to
know the speciﬁcity.
This theoretical problem has a robust empirical
manifestation in the well-known phenomenon of
affordance (Gibson, 1977; see Sumner & Husain,
2007 for a recent review). It is established that in
any set of circumstances the spectrum of possible
acts—not just the action performed—may be
discernible both behaviorally and neurally (Cisek &
Kalaska, 2005; Grèzes & Decety, 2002; Tipper, Paul,
& Hayes, 2006). For example, a subject faced with a
drinking cup will show activation of the cortical
“motor” areas contralateral to the arm with which
the position of the handle makes it likely she would
reach even if she has no intention to pick it up and
never picks it up (because it is someone else’s cup). A
great deal of the activity in the brain is related to the
recognized occasion of the possibility of actions. This
ought to be unsurprising—there can be no homunculus
in the brain deciding what the agent actually does, and
so activity characteristic of a spectrum of action
possibilities beyond the action actually made may be
observed at any time (Cisek, 2007).
Now task affordance—the variety that has been
studied—can be easy to detect—in the cup
experiment, for example, by the hemispheric
laterality of the behaviorally silent neural activity.
But temporal affordance, where possible acts differ
only in time, may not be detected in this way because
the associated neural activity may also differ only in
time (Figure 2). Furthermore, just as task affordance
is greater the less constrained the choice between
possible actions, so temporal affordance may be
expected to be greater the less sharply deﬁned the
range of possible timings of the invited movement-
precisely the circumstances sought in experimental
demonstrations of the Bereitschaftspotential. Indeed,
a monotonic modulation of activity in relation to the
time of the executed movement is exactly what one
would expect to see here, for the degree of co-
activation of the neural substrates of possible acts
would be expected to be proportional to the
temporal proximity of their movements to the one
actually made. In any event, there is no doubt that
temporal affordance will inevitably confound any
attempt to extract temporal information about the
relation between neural activity and the action
putatively associated with it. This ineliminable
confound makes it impossible to build any strong
causal models of voluntary action with such data.
Indeed, others have given plausible alternative
accounts of the Bereitschaftspotential invoking only
spontaneous variability in neural activity as its critical
foundation (Schurger, Sitt, & Dehaene, 2012).
EARLY ANTECEDENT ACTIVITY
The Bereitschaftspotential and its kin typically occur
less than one second before the movement. One
research group has observed predictive antecedent
activity substantially earlier than this, in the context
of a free-choice task where the planned action is made
differentiable by its multivariate pattern of BOLD
activity in the brain (Soon, Brass, Heinze, &
Haynes, 2008). Here the evidence seems at ﬁrst
sight stronger than in neurophysiological studies, for
the multivariate pattern of focal BOLD activity is
potentially much more speciﬁc to the task, though,
of course, the fatal temporal affordance confound
remains. Nonetheless, it is important to consider
some crucial features of the approach employed in
this study, as the criticisms generalize to other studies
that seek to characterize early antecedent activity in
this way.
To examine the speciﬁcity of antecedent neural
activity for an action inevitably requires an option of
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at least two actions so that the neural accompaniments
of each may be positively identiﬁed against the
baseline of not acting. To examine the timing of
such activity also requires two further things. First,
the action cannot be guided by an event in the
external environment such as the sudden onset of a
visual cue because the timing then becomes hijacked
by that event, making it impossible to know whether
the correlated neural activity is related to the
interaction between the cue and the action or to the
action alone. The choice must therefore be solely and
spontaneously the agent’s, without guidance from a
temporally limited external cue. Second, the agent
cannot know in advance what action she intends to
perform on any one trial because then she is free to
decide at any antecedent time—such as the end of the
preceding trial—in effect generating an operant
marker that ruins the timing in the same way as if
the marker were an external cue. The agent must
therefore make her choice at the start of the trial and
not before.
Now the ﬁrst requirement is easy, but what about
the second? To be conﬁdent that the subject chose
freely at the start of a trial the choice on any trial must
show no relation to the history of preceding choices:
i.e., the sequence of choices must be random. But it
has been repeatedly shown that human beings are
poor at generating random sequences—there is
inevitably contamination from the preceding history
(Brugger, 1997; Towse & Valentine, 1997; Tune,
Figure 2. The confound of temporal affordance.
Notes: It is crucial in behavioral experiments to consider not only the movements that are actually performed but also
those that could have been performed. The neural substrates that make movements possible must also make alternative
movements possible, and if the former is reﬂected in observable neural activity so may the latter. Indeed, the affordance
literature offers multiple examples of this, both in behavior and in imaging. This literature, however, has examined only one
kind of affordance—task affordance—where alternatives of what is done are explored. This is relatively easy to study because
alternatives for different movements have different behavioral and imaging correlates. For example, hand laterality of response
is dissociable by primary motor cortical laterality.
Now if task affordance exists so will temporal affordance: Neural activation reﬂecting the alternatives of when something
is done, rather than what. Such activation will not be easily dissociable with imaging—because the movement itself is the same
—and will manifest physiologically only with a widening of the distribution of neural activity time-aligned to the movement—
i.e., a Bereitschaftpotential. It will also be much more complex because time is not resolvable into a ﬁxed number of discrete
categories. It is therefore impossible to tell at what time point the activity is critical to the movement actually executed rather
than the alternative movements that are not executed, for the two categories are not neurophysiologically dissociable. Temporal
affordance therefore sets up an ineliminable confound in interpreting the signiﬁcance of any time point of the neural activation
antecedent to the movement.
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1964; Wagenaar, 1972). Indeed, far from ignoring the
history, a human will naturally monitor the sequence
—both past and projected into the future—so as to
attempt to pseudorandomize it, whether she admits to
it or not (cf. Ayton & Fischer, 2004). Note that this
problem is not overcome by not giving subjects any
instruction about what to do, and selecting, post hoc,
those who did not respond in a readily identiﬁable
pattern (as Soon et al., 2008 did)—indeed, the more
complex the pattern the more elaborate the subject’s
pseudorandomization scheme is likely to have been.
Thus, there are grounds here naturally to expect a
response bias at any time during the experimental
run, making it impossible to interpret the
signiﬁcance of the timing of any correlated neural
activity. This problem undermines all “free choice”
experimental designs—the very framing of the action
and its context makes it impossible to obtain an
interpretable result. Even if one could avoid a
sequence by testing each subject on only one trial,
the critical activity could occur at any time after the
subject is instructed about how to do the task, unless
the task instruction is immediately followed by a
movement, in which case the interval of antecedence
reduces to the range of choice reaction times, and the
question of early antecedence cannot be tested.
Speciﬁcity for the action that follows is also uncertain
here. The predictive power in Soon et al.’s study was no
higher than 60%, barely above chance. Crucially,
prediction here does not even imply speciﬁcity for the
action, but only some speciﬁcity for the outcome on each
trial. The earliest predictive activity may have been
related to the subject’s consistently thinking at this point
about the opposite action (following an inversion of the
gambler’s fallacy). No causal model can be plausibly
built on such data.
In short, there are currently neither cognitive nor
neural antecedent events that can be conﬁdently
brought into play in causal models of voluntary action.
Let us now turn to the second question of reclassifying
all or some voluntary actions as covertly automatic.
Covert automaticity in voluntary action
We have seen that a key index of the voluntariness of
an action is the degree of control the agent has over it,
fully voluntary action being the kind where the agent
has two-way power to act or abstain from acting as he
pleases. But neither our observation of someone’s
control, nor her sincere avowal of a capacity for it,
need be infallible. Where an antecedent or coincident
somatic event of some kind is highly correlated with
an action, the possibility arises that the movement is
directly caused by a component marked by the event,
whatever the subject might say. In such
circumstances, a movement that may appear to be
voluntary, and is reported to be voluntary by the
agent, may in fact be covertly automatic. That no
marker is visible does not mean that none exists-
new technologies such as functional brain imaging
may disclose hidden somatic markers that render
actions previously thought to be voluntary as
covertly automatic. We now need to consider the
criteria that must be satisﬁed for such redescriptions
to be valid.
Identifying a highly correlated antecedent is only
the beginning of testing for covert automaticity. For
example, blushing may always precede a voluntary
gesture of embarrassment, but it does not causally
necessitate the performance of such gestures—one is
always free to make a gesture or not to make it—and
so the gesture remains within the spectrum of
voluntary action. Observing a correlation merely
opens a possibility that needs to be explicitly tested
by investigating whether or not the agent is able to do
otherwise than the correlate suggests, i.e., whether she
retains control and is able voluntarily to dissociate the
action from its correlate.
Such a test requires an experimental behavioral
paradigm where, in its most basic form, on each
trial the agent is invited to make a movement for
which an antecedent has been identiﬁed, and on a
subset of trials is unpredictably cued—just before
she acts—to change what she does to something
else or indeed to no movement at all. The degree of
voluntariness is indexed by the proportion of trials
on which the subject can successfully change her
action in response to the change cue. Until an
antecedent–action pairing has been investigated in
this way, no inference to covert automaticity can be
made.
Now this “change” paradigm (and its relative the
“stop-signal” paradigm) (Band & van Boxtel, 1999;
Logan & Burkell, 1986; Logan & Cowan, 1984;
Nachev, Rees, Parton, Kennard, & Husain, 2005),
not only allows us to test any speciﬁc case but also
gives us a ceiling for the maximal antecedence of
any general correlate of action. It is so because the
mean interval between the onset of a change cue
and successfully refraining from making the
original movement is fairly consistent across
individuals and basic tasks. This value is in the
region of 200 ms (Bedard et al., 2002; De Jong,
Coles, Logan, & Gratton, 1990; Hanes & Carpenter,
1999). A correlated antecedent earlier than this can
therefore always be overridden because that is how
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long it maximally takes for someone to change to
another action in response to an unpredictable
event. Note that since an external event may be
made wholly unpredictable, it is impossible for the
agent consistently to anticipate it (unless she has
supernatural powers).
It may be objected here that a change in response
to an external event implies a “stimulus-driven”
action of necessarily lesser voluntariness than
spontaneous “internally-driven” action. Leaving the
problems of the notion of “internal initiation” aside
(see Nachev & Husain, 2010; Obhi, 2012; Schüü r &
Haggard, 2011 for discussion), it is false to argue that
an action prompted by a stimulus must be less
voluntary than a spontaneous one. Vomiting may be
preceded by a wholly spontaneous experience of
nausea, yawning by boredom, blushing by an
embarrassing thought, etc., and yet none of the
associated manifestations is thereby rendered
voluntary. Conversely, a complex action such as
writing may be prompted by hearing the bell
signaling the start of a written examination, a
football kick by the referee’s whistle, a heckle by a
bad speech, etc. In direct comparison, if I ran over a
pedestrian in response to a red light would I be less
culpable than if I ran them over without looking at the
lights? The primary criterion of voluntariness remains
control, within a spectrum of possible actions the
agent knows she can make, not the presence or
absence of any coincident events, either in the
external environment or the body of the agent.
Indeed, far from being an underestimate of the
maximum priority of a causal antecedent, change
reaction times in response to an external event are
likely to be longer than those in response to a
spontaneous change, for in the former case there is the
added burden of detecting a visual or other sensory
event. The minimum change time more accurately
corresponds to the “point of no return”—the time
before the actual execution of a movement after which
the process is ballistic. The precise magnitude of this is
controversial (see De Jong et al., 1990; Osman,
Kornblum, & Meyer, 1990; Allen Osman, Kornblum,
& Meyer, 1986; Verbruggen & Logan, 2009) but it is
obviously less than the value above.
Now let us suppose that we identify a neural
correlate within a plausible window of antecedence.
If the agent can (and does) act contrary to the
anticipated consequent, a causal link between the
antecedent and the movement must be discounted
and the action cannot be covertly automatic. If the
agent’s action is always congruent with the
antecedent, a causal link between the antecedent and
the action remains possible but since no dissociation
from what the agent wishes to do has been observed,
there are no grounds for overruling the natural
interpretation of the action as voluntary.
Nonetheless, such a ﬁnding would seem to imply
backward causation, for how else could an event (say)
100 ms before a voluntary action be a consequence
and not a cause of it? There are two aspects to the
answer. First, we cannot time an action to that
temporal precision—we cannot rely on the onset of
the movement, for we know that it is necessarily
preceded at least by activation of the motor neurons
immediately upstream of the muscle, and we have
seen that there is no cognitive correlate we can fall
back on. Second, the antecedent needs to be
empirically proven to have temporal speciﬁcity for
the action or else the signiﬁcance of its timing will
be extinguished by the temporal affordance confound
just as with the Bereitschaftspotential. In
neurophysiological studies where no such deﬁnitive
proof of speciﬁcity is available, the observed
antecedence is very short anyway: Of the order of
40 ms or less (Hanes, Patterson II, & Schall, 1998;
Paré & Hanes, 2003, see Schall, 2004 for a detailed
discussion). No problem of backward causation
therefore arises.
It is striking that none of the extant empirical work
arguing for covert automaticity has tested the question
directly in this way. We have seen that Libet-style
experiments depend on identifying a conceptually
questionable temporal event that is not even
identiﬁable within the temporal scale under study
(“When did you decide?” often has an answer, but
never in milliseconds—any more than “When did you
start lunch?”). Instead of testing control—the crucial
aspect—the experimenter here artiﬁcially asks the
subject to suspend it temporarily, and measures the
predictive power of an antecedent prior to the
purported “intention time,” inferring that the
antecedent must be superior to the agent if its
predictive power is greater than chance at that point.
Not only is this irrelevant to the key question, it
unjustiﬁably assumes that the agent’s inclination—at
the same time as the predictive antecedent—shows no
bias toward one response or another. Thus if, in Soon
et al.’s experiment subjects reported an inclination
towards their subsequent responses with >60%
accuracy at the same time as the predictive
antecedent (i.e., exceeding its predictive power),
then no superiority of the neural marker could have
been asserted. Naturally, one could not easily set up
such an experiment because the subject’s report of an
inclination in a free-choice task would inevitably be a
self-fulﬁlling prophecy. But that the problem is
empirically intractable does not relieve the
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experimenter of the burden of producing an explicit
comparison if the claim is to stand.
In short, there are currently no grounds for
reclassifying any voluntary action as covertly
automatic based on antecedent predictors.
CONCLUSIONS
We have seen that the study of the antecedents of
voluntary action is contaminated by conceptual
unclarities that make the hypotheses being tested
incoherent and therefore untestable. To make progress
here we must take heed of the following points.
First, voluntary action is not generally preceded by
any identiﬁable occurrent mental event such as an urge,
a “felt intention,” or an “act of will.” Urges aside, the
antecedents of voluntary action do not have a “volume
of experience” on which sharp temporal parameters can
be pinned. Urges included, if the subsequent movement
is causally linked to the antecedent, then the action
becomes not voluntary but automatic, and so not the
kind of action we are trying to explain. If these
antecedents are not causally linked to the action, then
their neural underpinning need not be causally linked to
the action either. The neural processes here tell us little
about the causation of voluntary action. What needs to
be investigated are not the neural causes of voluntary
action, but rather the neural conditions that enable
(make possible) voluntary action.
Second, temporal priority does not equal causal
priority. The cause of an event cannot occur after the
event but it can occur at any time before or concurrently
with the event. Within this interval, time can impose a
decisive hierarchy on the contribution of any component
only if there is a serial chain of events. But the brain is
not a serial deterministic system, like a mechanical
clock mechanism. If we know anything about the
brain, it is that it is vastly parallel in its organization
and that the causal connections between any serial
neural components are complex. Imagine two neural
components: An early component whose activity
predicts an action with 10% accuracy, and a late
component whose activity predicts with 90% accuracy
—is the early component properly referred to as the
ultimately causal agent because it is earlier? Simply by
noting that a creature is born with a primate brain—an
event so antecedent it precedes cogitative experience—
we can predict with at least 50% certainty that it will
seek to avoid spiders—does that rob it of freedom to
decide what to do when it sees a spider? Clearly, our
index here has to be primarily predictive power, not
antecedence.
Third, the occurrence of neural activity antecedent to
action robs the action of its voluntariness only if the
predictions based upon it hold irrespective of the agent’s
wanting to act otherwise. We have yet to ﬁnd a neural
marker that provides the basis for such prediction.
Hence, we have no grounds for reclassifying any kind
of avowed voluntary action as covertly involuntary.
Fourth, even if a voluntary action were to be found to
be covertly involuntary in this way, there is a hard limit
on the maximal interval between the neural marker and
the execution of the movement given by observed
behavior. If one can voluntarily and unpredictably
change from one action to another at latencies well
under 200 ms, it is not possible for any involuntary
component to take longer than this. To be sure, in
certain special situations there may be actions or
classes of action that can be predicted at any time such
as compulsive behavior in association with lesions of
the brain, say. But an interval true of voluntary action
generally cannot be longer than this—the neural here
cannot possibly override the observed behavior.
Fifth, rare discrepancies between a subject’s
actions and her sincere report—before, during, and
after an action—have no great physiological or
philosophical signiﬁcance. Acting and reporting on
one’s actions are things that human beings have the
powers to do. There is no necessity for one to be
causally linked to the other, and hence, that there
should be departures from their agreement in special
circumstances, is unproblematic. Equally, there is no
necessity for the neural structures on which acting
depends to be shared with the neural structures on
which reporting on one’s actions depends. Indeed,
given the functional specialization of the brain it
would be very odd for these different things to be
dependent on the same substrate.
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